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Abstract—This paper studies the problem of multi-stage
placement of electric vehicle (EV) charging stations with
incremental EV penetration rates. A nested logit model is
employed to analyze the charging preference of the individual
consumer (EV owner), and predict the aggregated charging
demand at the charging stations. The EV charging industry is
modeled as an oligopoly where the entire market is dominated by
a few charging service providers (oligopolists). At the beginning of
each planning stage, an optimal placement policy for each service
provider is obtained through analyzing strategic interactions in
a Bayesian game. To derive the optimal placement policy, we
consider both the transportation network graph and the electric
power network graph. A simulation software—The EV Virtual
City 1.0—is developed using Java to investigate the interactions
among the consumers (EV owner), the transportation network
graph, the electric power network graph, and the charging
stations. Through a series of experiments using the geographic
and demographic data from the city of San Pedro District of Los
Angeles, we show that the charging station placement is highly
consistent with the heatmap of the traffic flow. In addition, we
observe a spatial economic phenomenon that service providers
prefer clustering instead of separation in the EV charging
market.
Index Terms—Electric vehicle, charging station placement,
consumer behavior, nested logit model, Bayesian game, oligopoly.
I. INTRODUCTION
The continued technological innovations in battery and
electric drivetrain have made electric vehicles (EVs) a viable
solution for a sustainable transportation system. Currently,
most EV charging is done either at residences, or for
free at some public charging infrastructure provided by
municipalities, office buildings, etc. As the EV industry
continues to grow, commercial charging stations will need to
be strategically added and placed. Development of effective
management and regulation of EV charging infrastructure
needs to consider the benefits of multiple constituencies—
consumers, charging station owners, power grid operators,
local government, etc. In this paper, we concentrate on striking
a balance among the profits of charging station owners,
consumer satisfaction, and power grid’s reliability.
Our work is motivated by the desire of service providers
to make a forward-looking decision on charging station
placement to obtain a good return on their investment. We
use the most up-to-date information (i.e., travel pattern, traffic
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flow, road network, power grid, etc.) to make the best-effort
decisions on charging station placement, hoping that service
providers will have a good chance to profit over the next
few years. In this paper, we do not consider factors such
as uncertainties in fuel prices, climate change, population
migration etc., which are random and unpredictable. Instead,
we assume that some revenue management techniques (i.e.,
real-time pricing) may be applied to deal with the potential
effects of these factors.
We assume that the service providers aim to strike a balance
between the competing goals of maximizing their profits and
minimizing the disturbance to the electric power network due
to large-scale EV charging. Accordingly, we construct a utility
function that incorporates both of these aims. Each charging
service provider attempts to maximize his/her own expected
utility function while satisfying the Quality-of-Service (QoS)
constraints through choosing the optimal locations of charging
stations that s/he owns. The nested logit model is used to
analyze and predict the charging preference of EV owners.
At the beginning of each stage, the service providers predict
the charging demand of each charging station candidate using
the nested logit model. The optimal placement strategy is
obtained through a Bayesian game. As the EV penetration
rate increases, the existing charging stations may no longer
satisfy the QoS constraints and a new stage shall be initiated
to place more charging stations.
There is a growing literature addressing the issues relevant
to EV charging station placement. [2]-[5] formulated charging
station placement as an optimization problem. However, they
did not take into account the overall consumer satisfaction
and the impact of EV charging on the electric power network
in their works. Besides, their optimization models were
formulated from the perspective of a central urban planner
rather than that of service providers in a free competitive
market. In [6], the authors presented a strategy to deploy
charging stations by analyzing the patterns of residential EV
ownership and driving activities. In their work, they deploy the
new charging stations either randomly with no weight or only
based on the weights of population. They did not consider the
mobility of EVs and the overall consumer experience. In [7],
Bernardo et al. proposed a discrete choice model (DCM) based
framework to study the optimal locations for fast charging
stations. They treat each charging station as a player in a
noncooperative game. However, the underlying assumption in
their work is that each player has complete information about
other players, which may be overly restrictive and infeasible
in a practical competitive market. In this paper, we propose a
Bayesian game framework that does not require the complete
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2information of other players.
The main contributions of our work are: (1) A multi-
stage charging station placement strategy with incremental EV
penetration rates is first formulated, which takes into account
the interactions among EVs, road network, and the electric
power grid; (2) The nested logit model is then employed
to characterize the overall consumer satisfaction and predict
the aggregated charging demand, which provides insights into
the preferences and decision-making processes of EV owners;
(3) An oligopolistic market model of EV charging service
providers is studied and a Bayesian game framework is applied
to analyze the strategic interactions among service providers.
(4) A simulation software has been developed to analyze the
interplay among EV owners, road network, power grid, urban
infrastructure and charging stations 1.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the
problem formulation. Section III discusses the nested logit
model and how charging demand is calculated. In Section
IV, we describe the impact of EV charging on the power
grid. In Section V, a Bayesian game is used to characterize
the competition among service providers, and the optimal
station placement policy is obtained. Section VI shows the
architecture and applications of the simulation software and
discusses a case study in San Pedro District. Conclusions are
given in Section VII. Table I provides a full description of
parameters and symbols used in the paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this paper, we postulate the problem of EV charging with
an oligopolistic market structure that has multiple charging
service providers (oligopolists). The service providers aim
to maximize their expected utility while satisfying the QoS
constraints by selecting optimal station placements.
In particular, we consider the case of three service providers
that offer three EV charging services [8], namely, Level 1,
Level 2, and Level 3 (see Table II for details). Level 1
and Level 2 are AC charging. Level 3 charging is DC Fast
charging. Let O = {1, 2, 3} denote the set of charging service
providers. Moreover, we assume that service provider 1 offers
Level 1 charging, service provider 2 offers Level 2 charging,
and service provider 3 offers Level 3 charging. The three
charging levels represent three charging services, which have
different charging voltages and currents, charging times, and
charging experiences. In economic terms, they are imperfect
substitutes to each other. In our model, we are interested
in investigating how the different charging services compete
with each other in choosing locations and prices. Each service
provider can run multiple charging stations. At each planning
stage, service providers select some charging stations from a
given set of candidates, denoted as I = {1, 2, 3 · · · , L}. The
set of EVs is denoted as E = {1, 2, 3, · · · , N}.
A. The Profit of EV Charging
We assume that service providers run the charging stations
like “chain stores”, so that charging stations affiliated with the
1The EV Virtual City 1.0 simulator can be downloaded from
https://github.com/chaoluond/EVVirtualCity
Table I
PARAMETER DESCRIPTION
Parameter Description Unit
L Total Candidate Locations -
N Total EVs -
ψnj,k Charging Demand kWh
sj,k Placement Indicator -
Fj,k Setup Cost $
Rk Total Revenue $
cj,k Locational Marginal Price $
Πk Total Profit $
Uk Overall utility $
w Coef. of EV Charging Penalty -
Υk Average Service Probability -
Ξk Average Service Coverage -
tk Average Charging Time min
pk Retail Charging Price $/kWh
in Income of the nth EV owner $
dnj,k Deviating distance km
znj,k Indicator of Destination -
dth Distance threshold km
rj,k Indicator of Restaurant -
gj,k Indicator of Shopcenter -
mj,k Indicator of Supermarket -
Pbaseg Active power vector without EV -
PEVg Active power vector with EV -
Qbaseg Reactive power vector without EV -
QEVg Reactive power vector with EV -
vi Voltage at bus i Volts
φik Voltage angle between bus i, k Radian
α Coef. of tk -
β Coef. of pk/in -
µk Coef. of dj,k -
ηk Coef. of zj,k -
γk Coef. of rj,k -
λk Coef. of gj,k -
δk Coef. of mj,k -
same service provider have the same retail charging price. The
charging stations purchase the electricity from the wholesale
market at the locational marginal price (LMP). In a deregulated
electricity market (like PJM, NYISO, NEISO, MISO, ERCOT,
California ISO in USA, the New Zealand and Singapore
markets), LMP is computed at every node (bus) by the market
coordinator. LMP primarily consists of three components:
system energy price, transmission congestion cost, and cost of
marginal losses [9]. Let pk represent the retail charging price
of provider k (k = 1, 2, 3), and p−k be the retail charging
prices of the other two service providers except k. Let cj,k
be the LMP of the jth charging station candidate of service
provider k, and ψj,k be the predicted charging demand at the
jth charging station candidate of service provider k. The vector
Sk = [s1,k, s2,k, · · · , sL,k]T represents the placement policy of
service provider k, where sj,k ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator with
sj,k = 1 implying that service provider k will place the jth
3Table II
CHARGE METHOD ELECTRICAL RATINGS
Charging Method Nominal Supply Voltage(Volts) Max Current (Amps) Time from fully depleted to fully charged
Level 1 120 vac, 1-phase 12 A 16-18 hours
Level 2 208 to 240 vac, 1-phase 32 A 3-8 hours
Level 3 600 vdc maximum 400 A maximum less than 30 minutes
charging station. Let S−k represent the placement policies of
the other two service providers, θj,k be the placement cost of
the jth charging station. The total profit of service provider k
is given by
Πk = pkΨ
T
kSk − diag[Ck]ΨTkSk −ΘTkSk, (1)
and the total revenue of service provider k is,
Rk = pkΨ
T
kSk − diag[Ck]ΨTkSk, (2)
where Ψk = [ψ1,k, ψ2,k, ψ3,k, · · · , ψL,k]T, Ck =
[c1,k, c2,k, · · · , cL,k]T and Θk = [θ1,k, θ2,k, · · · , θL,k]T.
The notation diag[.] is an operator to create a diagonal
matrix using the underlying vector, and [.]T is the transpose
operation. In Equation (2), the total revenue from the sales is
pkΨ
T
kSk, the cost of purchasing electricity is diag[Ck]Ψ
T
kSk,
and the placement cost is ΘTkSk.
B. The Disturbance on Power Grid Due to EV Charging
It is conceivable that the simultaneous large-scale EV
charging can disrupt the normal operation of the power grid
in terms of frequency variation, voltage imbalance, voltage
variation, power loss, etc [10]-[12]. In a conventional power
grid, the generators will be incentivized to cooperatively
control the output of real power and reactive power to maintain
system stability, perform frequency regulation and voltage
regulation. The charging service providers typically cannot
participate in such market. Instead, we assume that they are
fined in proportion to the “disturbance” they impose on the
grid. Thus, the providers must optimally place the charging
stations to mitigate the “disturbance” to the power grid.
Accordingly, the overall utility function of service provider
can be defined as:
Uk = Πk − wBk, (3)
where Πk is the total profits from EV charging. Bk
characterizes the penalty arising from large-scale EV charging.
The variable w is a weighting coefficient, reflecting the
tolerance to the penalty. In the following section, we will
further discuss how to develop a proper metric to evaluate
the penalty Bk. We should note that the weighting factor w
in Equation (3) offers a mechanism for the charging service
providers to strike a balance between their own profit and the
“stress” their charging adds to the power system. If w = 0,
the impact of EV charging on the grid is not considered at
all, and a non-zero value of w implies some impact on the
grid—the larger w is, the larger the impact is. Generally, if
the focus is on the charging provider’s profit, a small w is
used. In practice, the value of w needs to be determined, e.g.,
with the help of heuristic and empirical data.
C. Quality-of-Service Constraints
We use two quality-of-service (QoS) metrics for the service
provider: (1) the average service delay probability Υk, and (2)
the average service coverage Ξk, (k = 1, 2, 3).
Υk =
1
N
N∑
i=1
υi,k, (4)
Ξk =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ξi,k, (5)
where υi,k is the average service delay probability for the i-th
EV owner getting the EV charged at service provider k. For
the ith EV owner, υi,k is defined as the ratio of the number of
delayed charging to the total number of charging attempts; ξi,k
is the average number of accessible Level k charging stations
along the route from origin to destination. Notice that υi,k and
ξi,k are random variables that depend on the travel patterns of
all EVs, the urban road network and the charging stations.
It is, thus, difficult to use a simple formula to compute them.
Instead, we employ Mento Carlo method to estimate those two
values.
D. Multi-stage Charging Station Planning Scheme
At each planning stage, the service providers aim at solving
the following fundamental problem to obtain the optimal
placement policy subjected to the QoS constraints.
[STk |ST−11 , ST−12 , ST−13 ] =
argmax
s1,k,··· ,sL,k
sj,k∈{0,1}
{
ES−k [Uk]|ST−11 , ST−12 , ST−13
}
, (6)
subject to
Υk ≤ Υ0, (7)
Ξk ≤ Ξ0, (8)
where ES−k [.] denotes the expectation over S−k, and STk is
the placement policy at stage T . The variables Υ0 and Ξ0 are
the predetermined QoS constraints.
To solve this problem, we are confronted with three
principal questions: (1) How to predict the aggregated charging
demand ψj,k at each charging station candidate? (2) How to
find an appropriate metric to characterize the impacts of EV
charging on the power grid? (3) How to derive the optimal
placement policy in a tractable way? For the first question,
4we assume that the service providers estimate the charging
demand using a nested logit model. In Section III, we will
describe the nested logit model and elaborate on how to use
this model to analyze consumer behavior and estimate the
charging demand. In Section IV, we will discuss how the EV
charging may impact the power grid, and propose a metric
to assess the impacts of EV charging. For the last question,
notice that the optimization problem formulated by Equation
(6) is intractable since the optimal placement decision for
every service provider also depends on the decisions taken by
other service providers. To this end, we employ a Bayesian
game model to characterize the strategic interaction and price
competition among the service providers. We will calculate
the optimal placement strategies and prices in Section V.
III. CHARGING DEMAND OF EV CHARGING STATION
In this paper, the aggregated charging demand at a charging
station candidate is defined as the sum of the product of the
probability that EV owners choose that particular charging
station and the electricity required to charge the EVs. The
charging behaviors of the EV owners may be influenced
by many factors that include the charging price, travel cost,
amenities at or near the charging station, the travel purpose,
EV owner’s income, and so on. We use the nested logit model
to characterize the attractiveness of a charging station.
A. Nested Logit Model And Probability of Choice
The nested logit model is widely used in the analysis and
prediction of a consumer’s choice from a finite set of choice
alternatives [13]. The main idea of nested logit model is that
a consumer is a utility maximizer. The consumer will choose
the product which brings him/her the maximum utility.
In our problem, the utility that the n-th EV owner can
obtain from choosing charging station j (j = 1, 2, · · · , L)
of service provider k (k = 1, 2, 3) is denoted as Unj,k =
U
n
j,k+
n
j,k, where U
n
j,k is the observable utility and 
n
j,k is the
unobservable utility. The vector of unobservable utility n =
[n1,1, · · · , nL,1, n1,2, · · · , nL,2, n1,3, · · · , nL,3]T is assumed to
have a generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution with
cumulative distribution function (CDF) [13]
F (n) = exp
(
−
3∑
k=1
(
L∑
l=1
e−
n
l,k/σk
)σk)
, (9)
where σk is a measure of the degree of independence in the
unobservable utility among the charging stations owned by
service provider k. For the nested logit model, j,k is correlated
within each charging level, and uncorrelated across different
charging levels.
We can decompose the observable utility U
n
j,k into two
components—the utility of choosing service provider k and
the utility of choosing a charging station j. In addition, we
assume home charging is the “outside good” in this market
[14]-[15]. Thus, U
n
j,k for EV owner n can be expressed as
U
n
j,k = W
n
k + V
n
j,k, (10)
where W
n
k is the observable utility of choosing service
provider k (choosing nest k), and V
n
j,k is the observable utility
of choosing charging station j given that service provider k has
been chosen; W
n
k and V j,k are linear weighted combinations
of attributes of the charging stations and the EV owner.
Note that the retail charging price and the charging time
are two factors differentiating the three charging services. In
addition, we assume the income of EV owners will also play a
role in choosing charging services. In contrast to our previous
work [16], we use a different formula to calculate W
n
k here.
W
n
k = α
1
tk
+ β
pk
in
, (11)
where tk, pk and in represent, respectively, the average
charging time, the retail charging price, and the income of
the n-th EV owner; and α, β are the corresponding weighting
coefficients. This model is similar to Ben-Akiva and Lerman’s
utility model in their study of public transportation mode
[17]. The value of α is positive because shorter charging time
implies a better charging service experience; therefore, leading
to higher utility. The value of β is negative because a higher
retail charging price results in less utility. However, the retail
charging price is divided by the income, which reflects that the
retail charging price for the EV owners becomes less important
as their income increases. As an “outside good”, the utility of
home charging is normalized, i.e. W
n
0 = 0.
Furthermore, we define V
n
j,k as follows,
V
n
j,k =µkd
n
j,k + ηkz
n
j,k + γkrj,k + λkgj,k + δkmj,k, (12)
where znj,k is the destination indicator. If the jth charging
station is near the EV owner’s travel destination (within a
threshold distance dth), znj,k = 1, otherwise, z
n
j,k = 0. The
term dnj,k is the deviating distance due to EV charging. We use
Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm [18] to calculate the travel
route for each EV owner from his/her origin to destination.
If an EV owner needs to go to charging station j halfway,
we define the deviating distance dnj,k as the route length
of this new route minus the route length of the original
route. Additionally, each candidate charging station has a
vector of characteristics [rj,k, gj,k,mj,k]T, which characterizes
the attractiveness of this charging station in terms of those
amenities. For instance, if there exists a restaurant near
location j, we may set rj,k = 1, otherwise we may set rj,k =
0. Similarly, gj,k and mj,k are the indicators for shopping
center and supermarket, respectively. The corresponding
weighting coefficients are µk, ηk, γk, λk, δk.
The EV owner’s choice is not deterministic due to the
random unobservable utility. However, we can derive the
average probability that s/he will choose a certain charging
station by taking the expectation over the unobservable utilities
defined in Equation (9). The probability that the n-th EV
owner will choose the j-th charging station of service provider
k is [13]
5Φnj,k = Prob
(
U
n
j,k + 
n
j,k > U
n
i,l + 
n
i,l,∀i 6= j, or l 6= k
)
=
∫ +∞
−∞
Fj,k(U
n
j,k − U
n
1,1 + 
n
j,k, U
n
j,k − U
n
2,1 + 
n
j,k,
· · · , nj,k, · · · , U
n
j,k − U
n
L,3 + 
n
j,k)d
n
j,k,
(13)
where Fj,k denotes the derivative of F with respect to nj,k,
i.e. Fj,k = ∂F/∂nj,k. Evaluating this integral with the above
assumptions, we obtain
Φnj,k =
eU
n
j,k/σk
(∑L
l=1 e
U
n
l,k/σk
)σk−1
∑3
t=1
(∑L
l=1 e
U
n
l,t/σt
)σt . (14)
B. Charging Demand Estimation
Once the EV owners’ choice probability is computed, we
can predict the charging demand at any charging station. Let
qn (n = 1, 2, · · · , N) denote the total electricity (measured in
kWh) that the n-th EV owner purchases from the charging
station. Further, let qn be a random variable uniformly
distributed in the range [Qa, Qb], where Qa and Qb are,
respectively, the lower and upper limit of charging demand
for all EVs. The total predicted charging demand of charging
station j of service provider k is modeled as
ψj,k =
N∑
n=1
qnΦ
n
j,k. (15)
All coefficients in the nested logit model can be estimated
and calibrated from preference survey data. The nested logit
model enables us to compute the probability that an EV
owner will go to a certain charging station, even though,
an EV owner’s decision may not always comply with the
calculated probabilities. An individual EV owner may go
to a fixed charging station at his/her discretion. However,
employing the nested logit model provides a statistically
meaningful prediction for the charging demand based on
ensemble averages.
IV. THE IMPACT OF EV INTEGRATION ON POWER GRID
The main function of the power grid is to deliver electricity
to users reliably and economically. However, large-scale
EV integration can potentially disrupt the normal operation
of power grid in terms of system stability, severe power
loss, frequency variation, voltage imbalance, etc. Generally,
the variations in voltage and frequency of electricity are
considered as the major factors to characterize the power
quality.
Assume that the power system has M generators and D
buses (substations), and the power flow study approach [19] is
applied to solve the voltage, real power, and reactive power in
the power system. Consider the node power equations, which
can be written as real and reactive power for each bus.
0 = −Pi +
N∑
k=1
|vi||vk|(Gik cosφik +Bik sinφik), (16)
0 = −Qi +
N∑
k=1
|vi||vk|(Gik sinφik −Bik cosφik), (17)
where Pi and Qi are, respectively, the injected real power and
reactive power at bus i. The variable Gik is the real part of
the element in the bus admittance matrix corresponding to the
i-th row and k-th column, and Bik is the imaginary part of the
element. In Equations (16) and (17), φik is the voltage angle
between the i-th bus and the k-th bus, while |vi| and |vk| are
the voltage magnitudes at bus i and bus k, respectively. The
stress on the voltage and frequency imposed by concentrated
charging at EV charging station is expected to be significant.
However, good models to calculate and penalize this stress are
not yet considered.
In [20]-[24], the authors have proposed different frame-
works to coordinate EV charging to ensure stable and
economical operation of power grid. In this work, we will
consider how to alleviate the “stress” added to the power grid
by EV charging when determining the optimal charging station
deployment.
Note that the voltage and system frequency are the two
important factors of power quality in the power grid. The
imbalance of the active power will lead to frequency drift,
while the imbalance of the reactive power will cause the
voltage variation [25]. Specifically, if the active power needed
by the loads exceeds the generation, the extra active power is
supplied by decreasing the generator’s rotation speed, which
results in a downward drift in frequency [26]. On the other
hand, the balance of the reactive power can influence the
voltage stability. The excess of reactive power will lead to
voltage increase, while the insufficiency of reactive power
will lead to voltage decrease [27]. Therefore, the demand and
supply of both active power and reactive power should always
be balanced.
Generally, the system operator schedules the power plants
by estimating the load. If the load fluctuates significantly
around the predefined value, the power plants are incentivized
to ramp up and ramp down. However, this results in low
efficiency and high cost from committing spinning reserves
[28]. Therefore, the fluctuation of the active power and reactive
power at the generators with and without EV charging can be
used as a metric to evaluate the stress that the charging stations
impose on the grid. In particular, we use the 2-norm deviation
of generating power (real power and reactive power) of all
generators in the power system to calculate the impacts of EV
charging.
B =
∥∥Pbaseg −PEVg ∥∥22 + ∥∥Qbaseg −QEVg ∥∥22 , (18)
where Pbaseg = [P
base
1 , P
base
2 , · · · , P baseM ] is a vector representing
the active power generated by the M generators under
the base power load scenario (without EV charging), and
PEVg = [P
EV
1 , P
EV
2 , · · · , P EVM ] is the vector of active power
with EV charging (i.e., base power load superposed by EV
charging load). Similarly, Qbaseg = [Q
base
1 , Q
base
2 , · · · , QbaseM ] is
the vector of reactive power of the base load, and QEVg =
[QEV1 , Q
EV
2 , · · · , QEVM ] is the vector of reactive power with EV
charging. For a specific power system, Pbaseg ,P
EV
g ,Q
base
g , and
6QEVg can be calculated through solving the global power flow
equations.
V. SPATIAL COMPETITION AND OPTIMAL PLACEMENT IN
A BAYESIAN GAME
It is pivotal for firms to choose the right location and product
to compete with rivals in the same industry. Business locations
will affect business competition, and conversely intensive
competition will affect how firms choose the appropriate
locations. One question arises naturally is whether or not
firms from the same industry like to cluster their stores.
There are some classical literature on spatial competition, e.g.
Hotelling’s location model [29] and Salop’s circle model [15].
Firms have incentives for both clustering and separation. On
one hand, firms prefer clustering so that they can learn from
each other on how to improve manufacturing and research
productivity [30]-[31], and learn demand from each other to
reduce the cost of searching for the optimal location. Firms
also cluster for the labor pool and supplies. In addition, firms
can benefit from the spinoffs that are located near parent firms.
On the other hand, the fear of intensive price competition due
to clustering may motivate the firms to separate locations from
each other.
The EV charging service providers face the similar
dilemma. Therefore, we need to investigate how the service
providers will interact with each other in choosing their
charging station locations and setting the retail charging prices.
In practice, the exact placement costs and utility functions
of the competing service providers may not be known to the
service provider a priori. We thus formulate the problem as
a Bayesian game [32] among the service providers at each
planning stage.
For notational simplicity, we omit the stage superscript in
the following definitions since the Bayesian game has the same
mechanism at each stage. The main components of a Bayesian
game include the set of players I, the strategy space Sk, the
type space Θk, the payoff function uk, and the joint probability
of the types f(Θ1,Θ2,Θ3). Sk = [s1,k, s2,k, · · · , sL,k]T
accounts for all possible placement policies for player k.
S−k is the placement policies of the competing players.
Denote f(S−k) as probability mass function (PMF) of the
placement policies of the other players. The type space Θk =
[θ1,k, θ2,k, · · · , θL,k]T corresponds to the placement costs of
all charging station candidates of service provider k. In this
paper, we assume that a service provider knows its own type,
but not the types of the other two competing players.
Let θj,k denote the placement cost for j-th charging station
candidate of service provider k, which includes the charging
equipment cost, installation fee, construction cost, land rental
cost, etc. θj,k has i.i.d. uniform distribution.
Before proceeding to analyze the Bayesian game, we need
the following assumptions.
Assumption 1: f(S−k) is binomially distributed with
parameter 0.5, i.e. S−k v Binomial(2L, 0.5).
Remark 1: The distribution of S−k reflects player k’s
conjecture on how other players will act during the game.
Each player can form their conjectures about other players
according to their beliefs about the competitors. For instance,
a player may be risk neutral, risk aversion or risk seeking. For
simplicity, we assume that S−k has a binomial distribution
with parameter 0.5. However, the theoretical analysis can be
applied to any other distribution of S−k.
Assumption 2: All service providers in the market are
Bertrand competitors.
Remark 2: Bertrand competitors are players that do not
cooperate with each other. Their goal is to maximize their
own utility. They will not form any type of “coalition” to
manipulate the market.
For each player, the Bayesian Nash Equilibirum (BNE) of
placement policy can be derived from Equation (6). To solve
Equation (6), we need to know the retail charging prices of
all the service providers. In a Bertrand competition, the retail
prices for every combination of the charging station placement
policies are determined by the first order of conditions (FOC):
∂Π1
∂p1
=
N∑
n=1
L∑
j=1
qnsj,1
[
Φnj,1 + (p1 − cj,1)
∂Φnj,1
∂p1
]
= 0 (19)
∂Π2
∂p2
=
N∑
n=1
L∑
j=1
qnsj,2
[
Φnj,2 + (p2 − cj,2)
∂Φnj,2
∂p2
]
= 0 (20)
∂Π3
∂p3
=
N∑
n=1
L∑
j=1
qnsj,3
[
Φnj,3 + (p3 − cj,3)
∂Φnj,3
∂p3
]
= 0 (21)
where cj,1, cj,2, and cj,3 represent the LMP at each charging
station candidate.
Remark 3: For simulation simplicity, we assume the
charging stations affiliated to the same service provider have
the same retail charging prices (p1, p2, and p3). However, our
analysis can be easily generalized to the case where each
charging station sets its own retail price. Note that those retail
prices obtained from Equations (19)-(21) may not be the real-
time prices used in practice. They are only the equilibrium
prices in this market under the assumption of Bertrand
competition. They can be interpreted as the averaged charging
prices of the service providers over a long period of time. In
practice, the service providers take turns to set the retail price
in response to the prices of the competitors. Additionally, if
some of the other factors change (i.e. consumer’s preference,
crude oil price soaring, etc.), the existing equilibrium breaks
and a new equilibrium must be computed using the same
procedure.
Theorem 1 [Strategy Decision Condition]: Service pro-
vider k will choose placement policy l(l = 1, 2, 3, · · · , 2L) if
the type space Θk falls into the hypervolume specified by
H(l) =
{Θk ∈ RL+ : ΘTk (Sk,j − Sk,l)− (ERk,j − ERk,l)
+ w(Bk,j −Bk,l) > 0;∀j 6= l},
(22)
where Sk,j and Sk,l denote the placement strategy j and
l, respectively. ERk,j and ERk,l denote the expected total
revenue with deployment strategy j and l, respectively.
Proof. Each service provider has L location candidates,
so there are 2L different placement policies. The type
7space can be seen as an L-dimensional space, and Θk =
[θ1,k, θ2,k, · · · , θL,k]T represents a point in this space.
By Equation (6), strategy l is optimal if
E[Rk,l]−ΘTkSk,l − wBk,l > E[Rk,j ]−
ΘTkSk,j − wBk,j ; (j = 1, 2, · · · , 2L, j 6= l).
(23)
Rearranging the terms, we get
ΘTk (Sk,j − Sk,l)− (ERk,j − ERk,l)+
w(Bk,j −Bk,l) > 0; (j = 1, 2, · · · , 2L, j 6= l),
(24)
where each inequality represents a hyperplane and the
intersection of all the inequalities defines a hypervolume in
the type space.
VI. SIMULATION PLATFORM AND CASE STUDY
We have developed a general-purpose simulation software—
The EV Virtual City 1.0 using Repast [1]. Our simulation
software is designed to construct a virtual digital city
by integrating a variety of data and information, such
as geographic information, demographic information, spatial
infrastructure data, urban road network graph, electric power
network graph, travel pattern, diurnal variation in traffic flow,
seasonal fluctuation of driving activities, social interaction, etc.
The platform is flexible in that one can include or exclude
many modules to satisfy different simulation needs. See Fig.
1 for the architecture of the simulation software.
Figure 1. The Architecture of The EV Virtual City 1.0
In this paper, we conduct a case study using the data of
San Pedro District of Los Angeles. We import the shapefiles
of zip code tabulation area (ZCTA) and road network data
from the U.S. Census Bureau into our simulation software. In
addition, we calculate the centroids of locations of residence,
restaurants, supermarkets, shopping centers and workplaces
using Google Maps, see Fig. 2.
From the California Energy Commission website, we
obtained the maps of transmission line and substations of
San Pedro District. This area has 107 substations in total.
Thus we use the IEEE 118-bus power system test case in
our simulation. For each charging station placement policy,
we used MATPOWER [33] to calculate the LMP of each bus
and the output power of each generator with and without EV
charging.
Figure 2. Roads and Buildings of San Pedro District
The service providers must also satisfy the QoS constraints
when planning the charging stations at each new stage. In the
simulations, we consider four stages with 5000 EVs, 10000
EVs, 15000 EVs, and 20000 EVs. Since travel pattern also
plays a significant role in analysing the charging behavior of
EV owners, it is necessary to have a thorough study on the
statistics of travel pattern. From the 2009 National Household
Travel Survey (2009 NHTS) [34], we obtained the travel
pattern statistics. See Fig. 3.
The Simulation Algorithm
• Initialization: Initialize road network, spatial infrastruc-
ture data, travel pattern statistics.
• EV Movement: For 1 ≤ j ≤ N (total number of
EVs), randomly assign a destination Des(j) to EV j;
calculate a route Route(j) from Home(j) to Des(j)
using Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm.
• Bayesian Game Solution:
1) Prices and Revenue Calculation: For 1 ≤ i ≤ M
(total number of deployment strategies), calculate
retail charging prices p1, p2, and p3. Calculate
R1,i, R2,i, and, R3,i.
2) Optimal Deployment Strategy Search: Find the
strategy for each service provider k(k = 1, 2, 3)
S∗k = l
∗ = argmax
l∈{1,2,··· ,M}
{
Rk,l −ΘTkSk,l
}
• Report: S∗1 , S
∗
2 , S
∗
3 , p
∗
1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3
Figure 3. The Statistics of Travel Patterns
8Figure 4. A Snapshot of EVs Movement
A snapshot of the moving EVs is shown in Fig. 4. Each
red star represents an EV owner. The traffic flow heatmap of
EV owners is also plotted in this figure. The simulation results
are summarized in Table III. Figs. 5 to 8 correspond to the
charging station placement for stages 1 to 4, respectively. Fig.
9 is an overview of charging station placement by superposing
Figs. 5 to 8. Fig. 10 shows how the number of charging station
increases as the EV penetration rate increases.
From the simulation results, we can make the following
observations:
• The optimal charging station deployment is consistent
with the EV traffic flow heatmap. This suggests that our
model can adequately capture the mobility of EVs and
provide EV owners with convenient charging services.
• As for the number of charging stations, Level 1 charging
station is predominant over Level 2 and Level 3. Level
3 has the least number of charging stations. Notice
that it takes a much longer time to finish charging for
Level 1, so Level 1 service provider must place more
charging stations to meet the average delay probability
constraint. The difference in quantity also reveals that
the service providers have different marketing strategies.
Service provider 1 tries to place the charging stations
evenly across the entire area, while service provider 3 is
more likely to place the charging stations at some “hot”
locations.
• The number of charging stations grows almost linearly
with the number of EVs except for the initial stage. At the
initial stage, Level 1 and Level 2 service providers tend to
place more charging stations than the next stages. This
is because service providers must place more charging
stations to meet the average service coverage constraints.
As the number of charging stations increases, however,
the service coverage constraint is less of a concern for
the service providers.
• Service providers prefer clustering instead of spatial
separation. The three service providers have segmented
the EV charging market by providing three different
products (different charging level services) in terms of
voltage, current, charging speed and charging price. Due
to product differentiation, they significantly soften the
price competition so that they do not need to spatially
separate from each other to further relax competition.
This observation supports the opinions in [35]-[36] that
firms do not have to maximize differentiation in every
characteristic of the product. In general, differentiation
in one dominant characteristic is sufficient to soften price
competition.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a solution to the placement
of EV charging stations which balances the benefits of EV
owner, charging station owner, and power grid operator.
We formulate the competition among charging stations as
a Bayesian game. Solving the game renders the optimal
placement policies for the service providers. In addition, we
develop a simulation software—The EV Virtual City 1.0 on
Repast, and conduct a case study of San Pedro District of
Los Angeles. The simulation illustrates that charging station
placement is highly consistent with the traffic flow of EVs,
and the service providers prefer clustering to separating the
charging stations.
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